| Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
March 2000
Joshua D. Guttman, The MITRE Corporation
Jonathan C. Herzog, The MITRE Corporation
F. Javier Thayer, The MITRE Corporation
ABSTRACT
In security protocol analysis, it is important to learn general
principles that limit the abilities of an attacker, and
that can be applied repeatedly to a variety of protocols. We
introduce the notion of an ideal—a set of messages closed
under encryption and invariant under composition with arbitrary
messages—to express such principles.
In conjunction with the strand space formalism, we use
the concept of ideals to prove bounds on a penetrator's capabilities,
independent of the security protocol being analyzed.
From this we prove a number of correctness properties
of the Otway Rees protocol, using these results to explain
the limitations of the protocol.
Publication
Published in Proceedings, 1998 Computer Security Foundations Workshop, June 1998.
Additional Search Keywords
N/A
|
