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# CHINA'S STRATEGIC VISION A SHORT PRIMER

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
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## Executive Summary

This paper summarizes points made in the papers published by MITRE's Center for Strategic Competition on "China's Strategic Vision." The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has a distinctive worldview built on: (1) a "comprehensive" conception of national power; (2) a monist theory of political authority and systemic dominance by the entity possessing "Comprehensive National Power" (CNP) in the greatest degree; and (3) an ideology of national grievance that drives China to wish to avenge supposed past wrongs by bringing about a "rejuvenation" that places Beijing "once more" in a dominant role in the world system.

China sees economics, military capabilities, political clout, diplomatic savvy, technological advantage, natural resources, geography, moral stature, and socio-cultural factors as aggregating into CNP and expects that the state with the greatest CNP will set the rules for the world system. Through "national rejuvenation," China aims to avenge its "Century of Humiliation" and become that dominant state.

The key ingredient of CNP, as the CCP sees it, is economic growth, which is essential to returning China to its status as the world's rule-setting central player. To this end, it has focused on acquiring cutting-edge technology as a key to winning back China's position at the center of the world. The acquisition of more and more military power is also central to "national rejuvenation," as high-technology military forces are "a benchmark of modernity and global status." Chinese officials believe military capabilities develop through "Revolutions in Military Affairs" through which the state with the most advanced technology acquires advantages over all others and can leverage these advantages for geopolitical gain; China intends to gain such advantages for itself in the future. As part of the "narrative warfare" component of the Party's vision of creating a Sinocentric world, Beijing has also become increasingly aggressive in using coercion to punish those who say things the CCP dislikes.

Indeed, the CCP has come to define China's "national rejuvenation" as including the construction of a Sinocentric regional order well beyond the People's Republic of China's frontiers. In fact, this vision places China at the center of a network of *global* physical and technological infrastructure, as well as political, economic, and security influence. As China's power has grown, the country has been more willing to speak of the CCP's system of governance as one that *itself* provides a model for the rest of the world. Officials envision what Xi Jinping has termed "a new type of international relations," in which China has surpassed the United States as the world's "indispensable power" and all others adopt a deferential position regarding China's global leadership. This desired end state bears a striking resemblance to the relationships that ancient China traditionally sought to create with the rest of the world.

## Introduction

Earlier this year, MITRE's Center for Strategic Competition published three papers on "China's Strategic Vision," describing the worldview and strategic ambitions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The first outlined the concepts through which CCP officials frame Beijing's approaches to foreign affairs and national security.<sup>1</sup> The second discussed the aspects of competition China envisions under its notion of "Comprehensive National Power" (CNP),<sup>2</sup> while the third described the future world Chinese strategists wish to create.<sup>3</sup> This paper offers a summary version of that long three-paper series for busy policymakers developing responses to Chinese revisionism.

## The CCP's Strategic Framing

### Comprehensive National Power

China's understanding of power sees economics, military capabilities, political clout, diplomatic savvy, technological advantage, natural resources, geography, moral stature, and socio-cultural factors as aggregating—in mutually supportive ways—into an overall concept of CNP in which states in the international system can in theory be ranked against each other.

### Sinic Monism

Chinese leaders' view of geopolitical power is influenced by an ancient assumption that authority exists in hierarchical form *within* any given organizational unit and that it organizes itself in concentric circles on a gradient of status and merit that proceeds outward from a single civilizational core to an ultimately essentially barbarous periphery.

In this vision, the most powerful state in the system sets the rules. As outlined by Xi Jinping and in CCP publications, dominant, rule-setting states have succeeded each other for centuries,<sup>4</sup> and world history is a succession of normative systems, each established by the dominant player of its day. And since China expects to continue to expand its CNP, Beijing expects that before long it will be able to set such rules for the world,<sup>5</sup> making China's national "rejuvenation" conceptually inseparable from the notion of its "return" to geopolitical centrality.

### Grievance Ideology

The motive force behind the CCP's drive to seize a CNP-fueled predominance for China is the Party's "grievance ideology."<sup>6</sup> What Xi calls "the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation"<sup>7</sup> is not merely about acquiring wealth but also about acquiring *position* in the world vis-à-vis other states. The CCP's claims of grievance focus on indignities felt to have been inflicted on China by Western and Japanese hands beginning in the mid-19th century.

Ancient China saw itself as the center of civilization, to which all others had to show awestruck deference. Having long had a self-image of axiomatic superiority and patronizing disdain for the non-Sinicized, China suffered a psychic shock when it was manhandled and easily bested by self-confident, prosperous, and dynamic Western powers at their 19th century imperialist apogee. This produced a traumatic civilizational "humiliation" from which China has never recovered.

Though for some years the CCP publicly downplayed its ambitions to restore China to the geopolitical predominance it felt itself to have enjoyed for centuries, increasingly self-assertive talk of "rejuvenation" is now in full bloom. The current fixation on "'rejuvenation' (*fixing*) invokes ideas of past glory, to which one is returning, invoking historical memory both of past greatness/centrality and humiliation."<sup>8</sup>

Achieving the “Chinese Dream” thus inherently implies China’s elevation *over* all others, as a sort of geopolitical “payback.” The quest for a “method to avenge humiliation” (*xuechi tiaoyue*) is central to Chinese nationalism<sup>9</sup> and a powerful engine for the CCP’s revisionist ambition.

### China’s Current Opportunity

Leaders in Beijing see China’s growing wealth and power as creating a window of opportunity for it in the mid-21st century. According to Xi, “changes in the global governance system and the international order are [now] speeding up.” The new era for China that is today dawning, Xi has said, will finally see China moving to “center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”<sup>10</sup>

This trend of geopolitical self-assertion has accelerated under Xi, who has left Deng Xiaoping’s strategic caution far behind. With a self-assigned timetable of achieving “rejuvenation” by 2049—the centennial of the Party’s founding—the CCP has given itself both an agenda and a deadline.

## Tools and Axes of Competition

### Economic Weight and Growth

The key ingredient of CNP, as the CCP sees it, is economic growth. Its industrial policy assumes that “transform[ing] China into the global manufacturing leader ... will lay the foundation for the realization of the Chinese dream to rejuvenate the Chinese nation.”<sup>11</sup>

Economic weight is seen as essential to returning China to its lost status as the world’s rule-setting central player, and the paramount political and civilizational model, in international affairs. On what is described as “the main battlefield of the national economy,”<sup>12</sup> the CCP hopes to “capture the ... high ground in the new competitive landscape.”<sup>13</sup>

### Technological Innovation

China has focused on acquiring cutting-edge technology as a key to winning back the country’s position at the center of the world. For today’s CCP, “science and innovation are at the heart of Beijing’s international standing,” and it is a key priority for Xi that China “catch up and surpass others” in this realm.<sup>14</sup> Its “Innovation-Driven Development Strategy” (IDDS)<sup>15</sup> aims to put it at the center of the global technology economy.

As with economic strength more generally, however, this is not being attempted merely for its own sake. Rather, the CCP sees technological innovation as essential to its project of geopolitical “return.” CCP leaders see technology competition as very much akin to war, urging their countrymen to “successfully fight tough battles for key and core technologies”<sup>16</sup> so that China “shall be established as a world S&T [Science and Technology] innovation superpower ... occupying the high ground in innovation.”<sup>17</sup> The IDDS declares that it is imperative for China to make “[b]reakthroughs ... [so that] the passive situation where key and core technologies have long been controlled by others shall be reversed.”<sup>18</sup>

In addition to acquiring know-how by luring foreign experts to China and taking advantage of Chinese students and researchers abroad, the CCP stresses the importance of taking better advantage of the enormous amounts of data generated by and within the modern Chinese digital economy. The CCP envisions a future in which “the cross-department, cross-level, and cross-regional convergence and in-depth utilization of data”<sup>19</sup> will enable advances in economic production, technological innovation, and social control.

### Military Power

The acquisition of more and more raw military power is also central to China’s imaginings of “national rejuvenation.” “The possession of high-technology military forces seems to have been regarded as a benchmark of modernity and global status by the

Chinese” leaders ever since they first encountered European military might in the 19th century.<sup>20</sup>

The CCP assumes that a wide range of cutting-edge technological capabilities, including those from the civilian sphere, can be employed in support of augmenting Chinese military power. The Party has set in motion an entire national bureaucracy—“a military-civil fusion platform for collaborative innovation in national defense science and technology”<sup>21</sup>—to identify and leverage military technologies for civilian use and civilian ones for military use. This “merging ... the basic elements for military-civil science and technology”<sup>22</sup> aims to erase the barrier between China’s civilian and military industrial and innovation sectors.

Chinese officials believe military capabilities develop through “Revolutions in Military Affairs” through which the state in possession of the most advanced technology acquires dramatic advantages over all others and can leverage these advantages for geopolitical gain. China wants the leading technology and hence these dramatic advantages for itself in the future. When it achieves military-technological preeminence, it expects to receive dramatic geopolitical benefits, forcing “the United States to adopt a ‘new type of major power relationship’ premised largely on U.S. strategic concessions.”<sup>23</sup>

## Discourse Control

In this vision, China’s tools for strategic competition go far beyond mere “material” aspects of power. They also include what is called “discourse control.” China’s success in building itself into a vastly stronger and more influential global power has encouraged it to adopt propaganda messages of an increasingly offensive nature, aimed no longer at simply protecting the CCP regime or China’s rise but now also at reshaping the international environment into the form that Beijing desires it to take.

Yet deep “discourse control” is not simply about propaganda messaging, for CNP theory also believes

socio-cultural factors contribute to a country’s overall power. In major planning documents, the CCP emphasizes promoting appropriate deference to and respect for Chinese culture—which includes disincentivizing (i.e., punishing) what is perceived as disrespect—as a key element in both domestic and foreign policy.<sup>24</sup> This is part of the “narrative warfare” component of the CCP’s vision of creating a Sinocentric world.

## Envisioning a Sinocentric World

### Visions of Sinocentrism

The CCP has increasingly come to define China’s “national rejuvenation” as including the construction of a powerfully Sinocentric regional order well beyond the PRC’s frontiers. Beijing’s strategic vision focuses on transforming the Indo-Pacific region into a single—and China-centered—economic and infrastructural whole, “reshaping the regional architecture ... in the Asia-Pacific”<sup>25</sup> in order “to create a new pattern of regional economic integration” linked to China.<sup>26</sup>

One should not mistake this merely for an economic development program, for China also seeks to establish the rules of interaction under which the entire Indo-Pacific will be expected to operate. As Xi has put it, ideas from China “will become the shared beliefs and norms of conduct for the whole region.”<sup>27</sup> The CCP aspires to “ensure that more people embrace the spirit of an Asia-Pacific family and the idea of a community of shared future”<sup>28</sup> that revolves around China and generally excludes the United States.<sup>29</sup>

### Global Governance

China’s objectives, however, are not solely regional, but rather part of a “strategic ambition” that “places China at the center of a vast network of global physical and

technological infrastructure, as well as political and security influence.”<sup>30</sup> CCP officials wish to “reform” mechanisms of international governance on a *global* basis,<sup>31</sup> and rebuild international institutions around China as a *paterfamilias* for the nations of the world<sup>32</sup> pursuant to “a theory of a globe-spanning universal society” led by the CCP<sup>33</sup> that will create “a new type of international relations.”<sup>34</sup>

### Controlling Global Narratives

Traditional Chinese thinking reflects an assumption about moral and political order that the act of *naming* encodes an understanding of each named entity’s role in the social order.<sup>35</sup> When the proper socio-political roles and rituals are “properly lived out, society will function as it should—from the level of the family all the way up to great affairs of state.”<sup>36</sup> The function of proper naming, therefore, is socially constitutive.

This helps give modern Chinese propaganda and narrative control policies a special urgency. CCP propaganda officials talk of struggle for global “discourse power” against Western “discourse hegemony,”<sup>37</sup> and view “grabbing the microphone” as essential to creating a new global order centered around China. Determined to control how anyone, anywhere thinks and speaks about China,<sup>38</sup> Beijing has become increasingly aggressive in using coercion to punish those who say things the CCP dislikes.<sup>39</sup>

### Asserting Cultural Dominance

The idea that barbarians would “turn[] toward Chinese customs out of admiration”<sup>40</sup> has a long history.<sup>41</sup> As noted earlier, culture is viewed as an element of exploitable national power and a tool of competitive advantage.<sup>42</sup> It is an objective of CCP policy to spread affinity for and deference to Chinese culture, so that China’s “influence ... will rise further.”<sup>43</sup>

### The China Model

As China’s growing economic, military, and political weight has encouraged it to feel free to pursue its revisionist geopolitical ambitions, officials in Beijing have also been more willing to speak of the CCP’s system of governance as one that *itself* provides a model for the rest of the world—and to describe China’s authoritarianism as an advantage<sup>44</sup> that lets one “concentrate force to do big things.”<sup>45</sup>

### The “But For” Party

It is essential to the CCP’s political legitimacy narrative to claim that *only* the Chinese Communist Party can bring about China’s “national rejuvenation.”<sup>46</sup> The Party has thus linked its domestic legitimacy not just to domestic growth but also to achieving preeminent *international* status for China.<sup>47</sup>

### A Vision of Global Primacy

The China Dream the CCP envisions is what the 14th Five-Year Plan describes as a “community of common destiny for humanity.”<sup>48</sup> This picks up on the concept of “building a harmonious world” that became current in the late 2000s. In that usage, the idea of a “harmonious world”<sup>49</sup> builds on the “harmonious society” being built in China itself; it signaled the CCP’s desire to export its conceptions of political order.<sup>50</sup>

CCP officials envision what Xi has termed “a new type of international relations” that has distinctively “Chinese characteristics”<sup>51</sup> and in which China is “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence.”<sup>52</sup> In this future world, China will have “surpassed the United States as the undisputed leader of the Asia-Pacific” and “as the world’s most ‘indispensable power’” globally.<sup>53</sup> China envisions the United States being in “a deferential position regarding Chinese leadership globally” by behaving “with a *de facto*



acceptance of a position of inferiority.”<sup>54</sup> In this future, “China is the global leader ... [and] [m]ajor powers manage their differences according to norms established by China” and “all respect the primacy of China’s interests and authority worldwide.”<sup>55</sup>

## Celestial Empire 2.0

This desired end state bears a striking resemblance to the relationships ancient China traditionally sought to create with the rest of the world. As China succeeds in “transforming the global order into a form more compatible with Chinese interests and values”<sup>56</sup> and revolving around China, Beijing must be the dominant, norm-setting central state in the world system.<sup>57</sup>

## International Relations Theory “with Chinese Characteristics”

From the perspective of constructivist International Relations (IR) theory,<sup>58</sup> China’s strategic theorists are in effect advancing a distinctive variety of IR theory:

1. In this vision, the purpose of every state is to *play its proper role* in a “harmonious” and vertically constituted system of social order centered on China. In such a system, those above are expected to show benevolence to their inferiors; those below must show loyalty, respect, and deference to their superiors; and all must know—and stick to—their specified place and role.
2. The organizing principle of national sovereignty in this vision is not democratic self-governance by a voting population within defined frontiers, but rather the degree to which any given people accepts and acts according to the value system of the harmonious order propounded by China. Those who reject the proper order of things by rejecting those values lack legitimacy.
3. The governing norm of procedural justice in this vision is acceptance of one’s status within the system: a Confucian sort of propriety rooted in the diligent performance of one’s duties within the proper social order.
4. The institutional rationality that arises from this system is one of tributary diligence: a performative international politics in which entities demonstrate their fidelity by giving appropriate status deference to and validating the legitimacy of the systemic center (i.e., China).

## Conclusion

This analysis is not meant to suggest that the CCP’s self-aggrandizingly Sinocentric global vision will actually succeed; there are various ways in which it may fail, and indeed the rest of the world may not find it remotely attractive anyway. Nevertheless, it is important to understand this strategic vision if one is to develop an effective counterstrategy.

## About the Author

**Dr. Christopher Ford** is a MITRE Fellow and Director of MITRE's Center for Strategic Competition, as well as a Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. He formerly served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, also fulfilling the duties of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Ford has served in multiple executive branch and U.S. Senate committee staff positions, as a think tank scholar, and as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He is the author of *The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations* (2010) and *China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations* (2015). The views expressed herein are entirely his own, and do not necessarily represent those of anyone else.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Christopher Ford, "China's Strategic Vision: Part One—The Communist Party's Strategic Framing," MITRE Corporation *Occasional Papers*, vol. 1, no. 1 (June 27, 2022), at 3-4, available at <https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/pr-21-02877-5-chinas-strategic-vision-the-communist-partys-strategic-framing.pdf>.
- <sup>2</sup> Christopher Ford, "China's Strategic Vision: Part Two—Tools and Axes of Competition," MITRE Corporation *Occasional Papers*, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 27, 2022), available at <https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/pr-21-02877-6-chinas-strategic-vision-tools-and-axes-of-competiton.pdf>.
- <sup>3</sup> Christopher Ford, "China's Strategic Vision: Part Three—Envisioning a Sinocentric World," MITRE Corporation *Occasional Papers*, vol. 1, no. 3 (June 27, 2022), available at <https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/pr-21-02877-7-chinas-strategic-vision-envisioning-a-sinocentric-world.pdf>.
- <sup>4</sup> Rush Doshi, *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2021), at 286-87.
- <sup>5</sup> Christopher Ford, *China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), at 427.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford, "Ideological 'Grievance States' and Nonproliferation: China, Russia, and Iran," remarks at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel (November 11, 2019), available at <https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/p2442>. (The other states he discussed in this category were Russia and Iran.)
- <sup>7</sup> Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Remarks to the 19th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party" (October 18, 2017), *Xinhua News Agency* (November 4, 2017), available at [https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content\\_34115212.htm](https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm).
- <sup>8</sup> Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), at 129; see also *id.* at 237.
- <sup>9</sup> Wang, *supra*, at 80-82.
- <sup>10</sup> Xi, "Secure a Decisive Victory," *supra*.

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- <sup>11</sup> State Council of the PRC, *Made in China 2025* (July 7, 2015), at 1 (from the introduction), available at <http://www.cittadellascienza.it/cina/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/loT-ONE-Made-in-China-2025.pdf>.
- <sup>12</sup> CPC Central Committee and the State Council, *Outline of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy* (May 19, 2016) [hereinafter “IDDS Outline”], at 4, available at <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/outline-of-the-national-innovation-driven-development-strategy/> [Chinese source: [http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/19/c\\_1118898033.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/19/c_1118898033.htm)].
- <sup>13</sup> *Made in China 2025*, *supra*, at § 1.1 at 3.
- <sup>14</sup> Elizabeth C. Economy, *The World According to China* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022), at 137.
- <sup>15</sup> IDDS Outline, *supra*.
- <sup>16</sup> National People’s Congress, *Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035* (published by *Xinhua News Agency*, March 12, 2021) [hereinafter “14th FYP Outline”], at 11, available at [https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284\\_14th\\_Five\\_Year\\_Plan\\_EN.pdf](https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0284_14th_Five_Year_Plan_EN.pdf) [Chinese source <https://perma.cc/73AK-BUW2>].
- <sup>17</sup> IDDS Outline, *supra*, at 5.
- <sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 4.
- <sup>19</sup> 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 42.
- <sup>20</sup> Ford, *China Looks at the West*, *supra*, at 201.
- <sup>21</sup> IDDS Outline, *supra*, at 6.
- <sup>22</sup> *Id.* at 12; see also *Made in China 2025*, *supra*, § 3.1 at 11-12.
- <sup>23</sup> Timothy R. Heath, Derek Grossman, & Asha Clark, “China’s Quest for Primacy: An Analysis of Chinese International and Defense Strategies to Outcompete the United States,” RAND Corporation (2021), at 71, available at [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA447-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA447-1.html).
- <sup>24</sup> See, e.g., 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 82-84.
- <sup>25</sup> Doshi, *supra*, at 227 (quoting Joint Sino-Russian Initiative).
- <sup>26</sup> Doshi, *supra*, at 240 (quoting Xi Jinping statement at the 2013 Work Plenum on Peripheral Diplomacy).
- <sup>27</sup> Quoted by Doshi, *supra*, at 182.
- <sup>28</sup> State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “China and the World in the New Era” (September 27, 2019) [hereinafter “SCIO, ‘China and the World in the New Era’”], at 47, available at [https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content\\_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html](https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html).
- <sup>29</sup> Heath, at al., *supra*, at xv & 105.
- <sup>30</sup> Economy, *supra*, at 22 (emphasis added).
- <sup>31</sup> Heath et al., *supra*, at 145.
- <sup>32</sup> Ford, “Envisioning a Sinocentric World,” *supra*, at 5.
- <sup>33</sup> Policy Planning Staff, Office of the U.S. Secretary of State, *Elements of the China Challenge* (November 2020 [Revised December 2020]), at 9, available at <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20-02832-Elements-of-China-Challenge-508.pdf>.
- <sup>34</sup> 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 102.
- <sup>35</sup> See, e.g., Confucius, *Analects*, Book XIII, Chapter iii, in *Confucius, Confucian Analects, The Great Learning & The Doctrine of the Mean* (James Legge, trans.) (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), at 263-64.

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- <sup>36</sup> Christopher Ford, *The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), at 30.
- <sup>37</sup> See, e.g., Doshi, *supra*, at 322.
- <sup>38</sup> See, e.g., Ford, *China Looks at the West*, *supra*, at 455-60.
- <sup>39</sup> See generally, Christopher Ford & Thomas Grant, "Exporting Censorship: The Chinese Communist Party Tries to Control Global Speech About China," National Security Institute Law and Policy Paper (April 2022), available at <https://nationalsecurity.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Exporting-Censorship-FINAL-WEB-2.pdf>.
- <sup>40</sup> Richard J. Smith, *Chinese Maps* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 7.
- <sup>41</sup> Smith, *supra*, at 9. Even powerful conquering barbarians such as the Mongols and Manchus were described in Chinese records as "gravitating to China out of 'admiration for righteousness'."
- <sup>42</sup> 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 7.
- <sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 8-9.
- <sup>44</sup> See, e.g., IDDS Outline, *supra*, at 2; see also 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 3.
- <sup>45</sup> Quoted in Economy, *supra*, at 142 & 4.
- <sup>46</sup> See, e.g., Xi, "Secure a Decisive Victory," *supra*.
- <sup>47</sup> Heath et al., *supra*, at 41.
- <sup>48</sup> 14th FYP Outline, *supra*, at 3.
- <sup>49</sup> Wang, *supra*, at 239 (quoting Wen Jiabao from 2009).
- <sup>50</sup> See generally, Ford, *China Looks at the West*, *supra*, at 428-40.
- <sup>51</sup> Xi, "Secure a Decisive Victory," *supra*.
- <sup>52</sup> Xi Jinping remarks in 2017, *quoted by Doshi, supra*, at 31.
- <sup>53</sup> Heath et al., *supra*, at 103.
- <sup>54</sup> *Id.* at 99.
- <sup>55</sup> *Id.* at 48-50.
- <sup>56</sup> Anonymous, "The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy," *Atlantic Council* (2021), at 29-31.
- <sup>57</sup> See, e.g., Ford, *China Looks at the West*, *supra*, at 143-44.
- <sup>58</sup> See, e.g., Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), at 31 & 33.

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